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GUNTER SCHRAMM* and MOHAN MUNASINGHE**

Introduction and Overview

Ten years have passed since the beginning of the so-called "energy
crisis." Over the course of this decade, the world slowly and reluctantly
has accepted the fact that the period of low, steadily decreasing energy
prices has come to an end. This recognition has set in motion forces and
trends which are bringing about fundamental readjustments in the way
energy is produced, used, and combined with other factors of production
and consumption. Initial short-term responses have given way to longterm adjustments, adjustments that will be mostly irreversible, regardless
of the cost of energy in the future. The following collection of papers is
an attempt to trace these emerging structural changes in energy demand
and supply.
The world first reacted to the initial quadrupling of oil prices in 197374 with disbelief and outrage. It was perceived that this rise was largely
the result of a political power play by the oil producer cartel which
eventually would yield to political, diplomatic, and economic pressures
by the main consumer nations; then historical price trends would reassert
themselves. Actual oil production costs in the major production countries
were only a fraction of the prices charged, and known reserves, worldwide, were still comfortably large compared to prevailing demand. Energy
policies, and energy user reactions, therefore, were marked initially by
temporizing, helped by governmental policies that blunted, or even totally
prevented, the pass-through of higher world market prices for oil to
ultimate consumers. This was generally done by either reducing existing
excise taxes or import duties, controlling domestic supply prices, or by
providing outright subsidies.
The gradual decline in real oil prices observable between 1974 and
1979 appeared to support an initial view that prices would tend to drift
back to levels closer to the marginal costs of production. Therefore, the
second oil crisis in 1979-80 was a rude shock to everyone, showing how
susceptible and vulnerable the world energy market had become to outside
political events. Ths second crisis, perhaps more than anything else,
*The World Bank.
**Senior Energy Advisor to the President of Sri Lanka; also Senior Economist-Engineer, The
World Bank, presently on leave-of-absence.
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finally convinced those governments still pursuing a policy of "cheap"
energy through price controls, subsidies, and regulations that those policies in fact were counterproductive and wasteful. Not all of these measures have been eliminated in every country, even now.' It appears,
however, that most of them will be eliminated before long and realistic
prices, subject only to sufficient regulation to prevent abuse, will be
allowed to affect energy production and consumption decisions in the
majority of countries outside of the eastern block nations.
Most discussions of the "energy crisis" tend to overlook an important
factor. All energy prices have not increased in real terms, nor at the rate
of petroleum product prices.
Petroleum products account for only about 46 percent of total commercial energy consumption worldwide. 2 The cost of other energy resources, coal, hydro, uranium, fuelwood, and, in many locations, natural
gas, have not risen, or have risen only in response to other factors such
as local scarcity (fuelwood), environmental and safety concerns (coal or
atomic power plants), depletion of regionally available, low-cost resources (natural gas) or deregulation of artificially low-priced supplies
(U.S. natural gas prices). As a consequence, energy costs to users overall
generally have risen less than the costs of petroleum fuels, and gradual
substitution toward lower-cost energy resources is modifying the impact
of petroleum price increases.
Several factors, however, which were independent of petroleum price
increases, also have contributed significantly to the impact of the latter
and to the rise of energy prices in general. In industrialized countries,
the rising concern about environmental degradation has forcefully affected
energy use patterns since the late 1960s, particularly with regard to the
use of contaminating fuels such as high-sulfur coal, and oil. Regulation
brought about massive shifts toward the use of environmentally more
acceptable fuels, such as natural gas, putting pressure on already limited
supplies. In addition, the rising concern about the safety of nuclear reactors led to ever higher safety requirements which vastly increased the
costs of atomic power plants, rendering them essentially noncompetitive
with alternative sources of electricity. In addition, environmental concerns
led to the addition of costly clean-up facilities at coal-fired installations.
These, in many cases, doubled capital costs and increased operating costs
as well.
For all of these reasons, the real costs of the main sources of commercial
1. See, for example, the complexities of natural gas price regulation in the United States, or the
regulated domestic petroleum and natural gas pricing structures in Canada. For a detailed discussion
of the latter, see Helliwell, MacGregor, & Plourde, Changes in Canadian Energy Demand, Supply,
and Policies, 1974-1986, in this volume.
2. World Bank, The Energy Transition in Developing Countries, Table 1 (1983).
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energy, petroleum fuels, natural gas, and electric power have risen steeply
compared to historical levels or compared to the costs of other goods and
services. As these increased energy costs are being passed on to energy
users and as energy users begin to realize that higher energy prices are
here to stay, fundamental shifts in use patterns are developing. At the
same time, the potential rewards for developing energy-saving technologies have been enhanced greatly, as have been the rewards for finding
additional supplies of conventional energy sources such as oil and gas.
To be effective, all of these forces and new developments require time
to be implemented. Energy-inefficient equipment and appliances have to
be replaced. Because of cost, this is often not feasible until they approach
the end of their useful lifetimes. Factories producing new, energy-saving
outputs have to be equipped, new products developed and brought to
market. Prospective new deposits of oil, gas, and coal have to be found,
proved, and developed. Years are needed until the full impact of all of
these measures affects long-term supply and demand. Today, ten years
after the "energy crisis" started, these new forces are finally making
themselves felt on a massive scale, but many more years will have to
pass until all readjustments take place. 3
To understand these trends and why it is so difficult to predict and
model them with conventional macro-economic tools,4 a brief review of
the many interacting factors that affect and change energy consumption
and production decisions over time is essential. As events during the last
ten years have shown again and again, the short-run elasticity of energy
demand is quite low, even in the face of rather drastic changes in the
costs of supply. This applies to price increases as well as decreases. The
reasons are easy to understand. First, energy is generally not consumed
for its own sake but only for the services it provides. The total costs of
these services, in most activities, are far greater than those for the energy
component alone (e.g. the total costs of owning and operating an automobile versus the cost of gasoline and lubricants only). Hence, even
sharp changes in energy costs affect the total systems costs by a much
smaller margin. 5 Second, the available alternatives in the short-run are
limited. Thermostats can be lowered, or pleasure driving can be reduced,
but the specific fuel efficiency of a given vehicle will remain unchanged.
In some locations, private transport by automobile can be replaced by
3. For a discussion of these structural adjustments in developing countries, see Munasinghe,
Energy Strategies for Oil Importing Developing Countries, in this volume.
4. For an application of these tools, see Pindyck & Rotemberg, Energy Price Shocks and Macroeconomic Adjustments, in this volume and Helliwell, MacGregor, & Plourde, supra note 1.
5. Overall, as a percent of GNP, the costs of energy supplies range between a few to about 10%
of total GNP in most countries. For individual activities or production processes, energy costs are
usually but a small fraction of total costs, even today, with the exception of a few energy-intensive
activities. For a description of the latter, see Ross, Industrial Energy Conservation, in this volume.
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public transport. Most of the changes that can be accomplished in the
short-run, however, are also short-run in nature. If and when prices change
back to previous levels, most of the old habits quickly reassert themselves. 6
Options in the medium-term are much greater and changes brought
about are usually also more permanent. Broken windows can be repaired,
new insulation installed, or energy-inefficient vehicles replaced. Existing
plants might be retrofitted with recirculation equipment that uses waste
heat, or convert their boilers and furnaces from use of gas or oil to coal.
In the long-run, substantive and generally irreversible changes are the
result of actual and expected, permanently higher energy prices. Given
this scenario, users place far more emphasis on energy efficiency as a
criterion for investment decisions. Appliances, vehicles, industrial equipment, power plants, smelters, and refineries will be designed to reflect
the new energy-price relationships. Moreover, because of the higher costs
of energy, new technologies will be developed to bring about such higher
efficiencies. Cars and trucks today, on average, are far more energy
efficient in any price and weight class than they were only five to eight
years ago. Plastic and aluminum are used instead of heavier steel. Fuel
injection or diesel engines are replacing carburetors or less efficient gasoline engines. New micro-processors are used more and more to optimize
fuel consumption at specific load conditions, thus reducing waste. In
electric power production, for example, gas-fired, combined-cycle plants
bring about fuel efficiencies as high as 60 to 70 percent compared to less
than 30 percent for simple gas turbines that were popular before. Waste
products such as wood waste and cooking liqueurs in pulp and paper
mills or saw mills are now used to provide most, if not all, of the energy
requirements of such plants (they sometimes even produce surpluses of
electric power). Where liquid petroleum gas (LPG) and natural gas are
available and significantly lower-priced than petroleum fuels, they are
replacing gasoline or diesel as transport fuels.' Atomic power plants
replace oil or gas-fired ones, in France, Canada, Argentina, Korea, and
the Eastern Bloc nations. 8 Most of these changes are permanent. Houses
and commercial buildings, built to more exacting thermal efficiency standards, will remain energy efficient regardless of the cost of energy, and
greater efficiencies built into new vehicles will not disappear because the
price of gasoline falls. What we see, then, is a permanent shift toward
6. See, for example: Lillard & Acton, Seasonal Electricity Demand and Pricing Analysis with a
Variable Response Model, 12 BELL J. OF ECON. 71 (1981), and Wheaton, The Long-Run Structure
of Transportation and Gasoline Demand, 13 BELL J. OF ECON. 439 (1982).
7. See also Schramm, The Changing World of Natural Gas Utilization, in this volume.
8. Although this replacement has slowed down substantially in the United States, West Germany,
Sweden, Austria, or other western countries because of safety and cost considerations.
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lower energy use per unit of production or consumption. These shifts,
however, are not uniform over time or uniform for given activities. They
are inextricably related to life expectancies of existing equipment, houses,
factories, power plants, or manufacturing facilities. In declining or mature
industries, such as steel production and paper, changes beyond retrofitting
of existing facilities may be very slow because of existing overcapacity
and disincentives to invest in new plants and equipment. 9 In other rapidly
expanding activities, changes in average energy efficiencies per unit of
output may be drastic indeed. In addition, governmental policies may
have a major effect on the rates of change from higher to lower energyuse intensities on the one hand, or the development of new supply sources
on the other."°
The average energy intensities per unit of average GNP will be affected
by the gradual migration of energy-intensive industries to locations around
the globe where energy is still cheap and plentiful because it has few
alternative uses. Major candidates are electro-process industries, such as
aluminum smelting, or petrochemical industries using natural gas feedstocks. "
On the demand side a gradual, far from uniform, but largely permanent
shift toward lower energy intensities per unit of output can be seen. Some
of these shifts in a given activity may be completed within a few months
or years. Others may require decades. Many other factors besides energy
costs affect these changes.' 2 To predict these changes and their time
patterns requires detailed, plant-by-plant and activity-by-activity analyses
carried out at the micro-level to show what potentials exist and at what
speed these potentials may be realized.' 3 Short of such detailed studies, 4
the uncertainties of prediction will always remain high. For this reason,
even the most sophisticated demand forecasting models will always be
subject to significant margins of error, because they have to be based on
past technological-economic relationships that may no longer exist in the
future.
Most responses on the supply side are equally long-term and inflexible
in nature. Possible short-term responses to higher or lower prices, how9. See also Ross, supra note 5.
10. See Munasinghe, supra note 3, and Helliwell, MacGregor & Plourde, supra note 1.
11. For a discussion of these effects on natural gas utilization patterns, see Schramm, supra note
7.
12. Including, for example, governmental decisions to protect high-cost, energy-inefficient industries.
13. For some activities such changes are easier to predict than others. In analyzing gas consumption
for automobiles, for example, the specific fuel consumption rates can be aggregated on the basis of
vehicle specifications. What is more difficult to predict, however, are scrappage rates of existing
vehicles and future fleet composition (which depend on individual buyer decisions), and mileages
driven.
14. For two examples of such evaluations, see Ross, supra note 5.
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ever, may well reinforce price swings. When petroleum prices rise rapidly,
it pays owners of existing stocks to speculate on further price increases,
making it attractive to hold existing stocks or even add to them, rather
than sell. The opposite is the case when prices are falling and existing
stocks are dumped on the market, forcing prices down further. These
attempts at reaping windfall profits or preventing windfall losses have
amplified price fluctuations to a significant degree in the past, 5 and are
likely to do so again in the future.
In the long-run, higher prices induce the search for additional resources,
because it is now more profitable to do so. This search is not only
intensified in traditional areas of production, but it is expanded into highcost regions, for example, in off-shore locations, or in the Arctic. In
addition, potential resources which before were considered marginal, such
as oil from secondary or tertiary recovery, heavy oils, tarsands, or oil
from shales, become economically attractive and may induce investments
which, once made, are usually irreversible. 6 Ultimately, these new activities yield fruit and higher supplies are forthcoming, even though the
time from initial exploration or development to production may span
many years. New supplies augment existing ones and start taking over
market shares of existing producers, thereby moderating prices. Because
of the high capital intensities of most of these activities (in oil and gas
developments, initial capital costs usually amount to 80 to 90 percent of
the total life-cycle costs of a deposit), new producers usually have little
choice but to produce in order to recapture at least part of their heavy
financial outlays, making them quite inflexible in terms of production
decisions even in the face of falling prices.
In summary, at present and for quite a number of years to come, this
gradual adjustment process is propelled by a myriad of independent decision makers, leading to reduced energy consumption on the one hand
and abundant energy supplies through increased exploration and development activities on the other. By their very nature, these trends are slow
in developing but even slower to stop once they have been set in motion. 7
On the demand side, they generally represent a permanent shift from
higher to lower energy intensities per unit of output. The implementation
of these shifts generally follows an S-shaped path, accelerating as more
and more users adopt new technologies, install new equipment, or change
consumption patterns, but slowing down as the change-overs reach saturation.
15. See Adelman, Coping with Supply Insecurity, 3 THE ENERGY J. 6 ff (April 1982).
16. Except for those whose operating costs turn out to be well above market values for the output.
The aborted Exxon oil shale venture in Colorado or the two costly, now cancelled, Algerian LNG
import schemes to the United Staes are examples of such misinvestments that were based on unrealistic
price expectations.
17. See Ross, supra note 5.
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Because of these response patterns, the rates of change themselves are
not stable, and estimated elasticities based on observations of changes
over any given time interval or across similar activities in different locations are also not stable. Any macro-econometric analysis, therefore,
ultimately must be underpinned by micro-activity studies, because it is
really at the micro-level where the actual changes are taking place. These
changes and their rates are the consequence of many outside factors
besides the cost of energy, so their analysis must take into account governmental policies, dissemination of knowledge, capital and resource
availabilities, and growth or decay rates of the underlying, energy-using
activities.
Effects on the supply side usually are slower in coming. Eventually,
they lead to an augmentation of existing supplies from new, but usually
higher-cost sources. These new supplies encroach on market shares of
existing suppliers who already are faced with a shrinking market, 8 ultimately affecting prices in a downward direction.
The Papers in Brief
The collection of papers contained in this volume attempts to capture
the essence of these long-term adjustment processes and to measure their
magnitude, direction, and timing. They have been designed to address
these issues within a worldwide context. Given the complexities of the
task at hand, however, they necessarily have to be selective in terms of
both geographic and topical coverage. They use both macro- and microapproaches, showing how both types of analysis are inextricably interrelated and complimentary to each other.
Pindyck and Rotemberg analyze the macro-economic effects of both
sudden and gradual energy price increases for variables such as national
and personal income, inflation, unemployment, and investment. Using a
complex, highly sophisticated mathematical model, they trace the dynamics of these changes and derive conclusions about appropriate economic and energy policies to minimize the adverse impacts of energy
price increases. They show how energy prices can affect macro-economic
variables through a variety of different channels and outline a number of
policies that could be used to minimize the adverse effects.
Helliwell, MacGregor, and Plourde try to explain the major changes
that have taken place in Canadian energy demands, supplies, and policies
in the decade since 1973. They also project energy demand and supply
until 1986 under alternative patterns of world oil prices and domestic
Canadian energy policies. They use a macro-economic modeling approach
to analyze those changes and predict future consequences. Their discussion of the effects of the policies that were pursued by the federal and
18. Shrinking, if not in absolute, then at least in relative terms.
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provincial governments in their competition for shares of potential energy
revenues from Canadian oil and gas production is of particular interest
to governmental policy makers throughout the world. Overall, the authors
conclude that the energy policies pursued in Canada have succeeded in
moderating the speed of domestic energy price changes, as well as in
redistributing among regions the very large windfall gains and losses
accruing to Canadian producers from the major changes in world oil
prices. They also show that the overall levels of national income in 1983
are very similar to what they would have been if world prices for petroleum products had been used as the benchmark prices paid by Canadian
energy users. This is an important lesson for those governments still
convinced that low-cost energy is essential for propelling economic growth.
G. F. Ray surveys the energy future of Western Europe, the world's
largest energy-deficient region. After describing the current situation, he
assesses the outlook for domestic resources and potential availability of
imported supplies. He then looks at the long-term future toward the end
of this century and beyond, which he feels will be a crucial period because
of the approaching depletion, worldwide, of conventional petroleum resources. His paper is supported by extensive statistical data and an annex
which briefly discusses the energy situation in Eastern Europe.
M. Munasinghe analyzes the impact of the past two oil price increases
on the oil-importing, developing countries. He finds that their reactions
were influenced strongly by developments in the industrialized world,
and energy issues were inextricably linked with economic development
problems. He concludes that in the short to medium-run the principal
policy options for developing countries are to increase efficiency of both
energy supply and consumption. Greater utilization of indigenous energy
resources is the most critical and longer-term option that would permit
gradual reductions in oil-import dependence. He discusses specific strategies for the oil, gas, coal, electric power, geothermal, biomass, and new
energy sources subsectors, and concludes that the policy recommendations developed in his paper are valid over a reasonably wide range of
future energy price scenarios.
While the first four contributions rely largely on macro-analytical approaches to derive their findings, the papers by M. Ross and G. Schramm
address and evaluate the issues basically from a micro-perspective. Ross
analyzes the energy requirements of U.S. industry, focusing on the sectors
that dominate industrial energy use, the basic materials industries. After
presenting current data on energy use, he analyzes them in terms of
production levels and energy consumption per physical unit of output.
Various causes of change in these components are identified, and the
trends of the past decade determined. He then focuses on two specific
industries-paper and steel. Taking account of demand, supply, and tech-
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nological factors, he concludes that the decline or stagnation of industrial
energy requirements, which has characterized the past years, is likely to
continue for the next decade.
In studying his findings, it is perhaps ironic to note that the increase
in petroleum prices apparently resulted in a much slower introduction of
energy-saving technologies in the U.S. steel industry. High petroleum
prices have accelerated the substitution of lighter materials for steel, and
have brought about a down-sizing of cars, a major user of steel. The
resulting decline of, and development of excess capacities in, the steel
industry have reduced drastically the incentives for investments in new
and more energy efficient production facilities, slowing down energy
conservation.
Schramm's paper focuses on changing energy demand and supply patterns for natural gas in different regions of the world. Largely as a result
of the increased search for oil, many new gas deposits have been found,
most of them far from conventional gas markets. Because of the high
cost of gas transport, the in-situ value of gas in many locations is low.
This makes it possible to utilize gas as a systematic substitute for costly
oil, in spite of higher user costs. Tracing through specific examples,
Schramm shows that it is attractive economically for such gas-rich countries to bring about systematically such substitution. He concludes that,
as a consequence, gas consumption patterns will differ sharply in the
future between developed countries which are net gas importers at the
margin, and gas-rich, but oil-poor, developing countries.

